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any essay on those who suffered from and challenged the domi-
nant economic arrangements of the nineteenth century. Labor, 
unions, and populists do not appear in the essays. 
As noted above, the introduction attempts to find common 
ground among the essays. The essays, its tells us, focus on "law 
in actual practice: the social functions of the law, the cultural val-
ues embodied in law, and the meaning of the Constitution and 
law to the powerless." These are pursued "[i]nstead of examin-
ing formal lawmaking bodies and the development of doctrine." 
The past is understood on its own terms. 
But of course, as the essays in the book illustrate, we see the 
past from the vantage point of the present. It cannot be any 
other way. Legal history is a great patchwork quilt.B Doctrine, 
formal lawmaking bodies, and the present meaning of the past 
are inevitably part of the picture, a picture enriched by fine es-
says in this book. 
APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED STATES. By Gary Jef-
frey Jacobsohn.1 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 1993. Pp. 284. Cloth $39.50. 
Michel Rosenfe/d2 
What is the difference between constitutionalism and consti-
tution? Does constitutionalism embody universal norms that 
transcend differences in historical experiences and in political 
culture? Is adherence to constitutionalism possible without a 
written constitution? Can constitutions be transplanted from one 
political culture to another? These are important and topical 
questions in the wake of the dramatic contemporary tum towards 
constitutionalism and recent proliferation of constitutions.3 In-
deed, as more and more countries rush to embrace constitution-
13. The metaphor is not mine, but I cannot recall where I got it. 
1. Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College. 
2. Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Co-
Director Cardozo-New School Project on Constitutionalism. I wish to thank my col-
league David Gray Carlson for his helpful comments. 
3. Since the end of World War II, and especially since the collapse of socialist re-
gimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, constitutionalism increasingly ap-
pears poised to achieve a worldwide sweep. See Michel Rosenfeld, Modem 
Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diversity: An Introduction, 14 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 497 (1993). 
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alism, one wonders whether its meaning is becoming so diluted 
as to transform it into a mere fashionable slogan capable of ac-
commodating a broad array of disparate and even antagonistic 
ideals, norms and practices, or whether we are witnessing the ad-
vent of a global convergence towards a new democratic order. 
Moreover, as constitutionalism spreads, opportunities and temp-
tations to transplant constitutions seem to multiply, while at the 
same time, an increasing diversity of home-grown constitutional 
arrangements vie for a lasting place in the political firmament. 
The embrace of constitutionalism and the spread of constitu-
tions call for the systematic examination of constitutionalism on a 
comparative basis. Under these circumstances, comparative con-
stitutionalism becomes imperative for at least two important rea-
sons: first, to assess whether, and to what extent, constitutions 
may be successfully transplanted from one political culture to an-
other; and, second, paradoxically, to gain a better position from 
which to evaluate one's own constitutional order. Indeed, as the 
variety of constitutional norms and practices greatly expands, 
one becomes more prone to realize-and this is particularly ur-
gent for Americans who, by and large, tend to focus exclusively 
on their own constitution4-that one's own constitutional solu-
tions are by no means the only available ones or the only ones 
capable of meeting with success. Thus, by focusing on how for-
eign constitutional norms and practices fare in dealing with issues 
similar to those confronted at home, one can gain a broader and 
better vantage point from which to evaluate the virtues and limi-
tations of one's own constitutional norms and practices. 
Good work on comparative constitutionalism, however, is 
hard to come by, because it requires a solid grounding in at least 
two different constitutional orders and at least two political cul-
tures. Accordingly, Gary Jacobsohn's rich and nuanced compari-
son of constitutionalism in Israel and the United States is a 
remarkable achievement, which provides scholars in the growing 
field of comparative constitutionalism with a framework for anal-
ysis that is well worth emulating. Moreover, Jacobsohn's focus 
on Israel and the United States is particularly felicitous, as it 
brings together not only a country with a written constitution and 
one without, but also two approaches to constitutionalism and 
two political cultures that yield an optimal mix of similarities, 
contrasts, and points of contact to shed useful light on the rela-
4. Significantly, a perusal of the leading case books on American constitutional law 
used in law schools throughout the United States reveals that references to other constitu-
tions are virtually non-existent. 
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tionships between constitution and constitutionalism, between 
constitutionalism and cultural identity, and between constitution-
alism and democracy. In addition, because of the significant in-
fluence of the American constitution on Israeli constitutional 
thought and practice, Jacobsohn's focus on these two countries 
affords insight into the scope and limits of successful constitu-
tional transplantation. Finally, Jacobsohn skillfully invokes the 
contrast between the United States' predominantly individualis-
tic political culture and Israel's primarily communitarian one to 
sharpen our understanding of American constitutional 
developments. 
Jacobsohn's principal focus is on the comparison of particu-
lar features of the constitutional cultures of Israel and the United 
States, but his ultimate objective is more ambitious, as he aims 
"to contribute more broadly to an improved understanding of 
the nature of constitutionalism." In this latter endeavor, Jacob-
sohn is not entirely successful, as some of his generalizations are 
questionable, either because they are not sufficiently supported 
by the particular comparisons from which they are drawn, or be-
cause they are parasitic on concepts that remain undefined or 
underdefined, most notably the very concept of "constitutional-
ism."s In the last analysis, however, these shortcomings should 
not detract from the importance or the overall success of his sub-
tle and incisive analysis. Even if one disagrees with some of 
Jacobsohn's conclusions, his comparative examination of Israel 
and the United States certainly provides the reader with a wealth 
of materials for fruitful thought and discussion on these crucial 
yet difficult subjects. 
Jacobsohn's comparative analysis sharpens our grasp of 
many of the key issues confronting constitutions and constitu-
tionalism. These issues include: the relationship among constitu-
tions, citizenship, and national and group identity; the 
relationship among constitutionalism, liberal democracy, republi-
5. While there is a great amount of discussion of constitutionalism throughout the 
book, Jacobsohn is not always careful to distinguish between "constitution," "constitu-
tional" and "constitutionalism." See, e.g., p. 231 where he states that "the raison d'etre of 
constitutional government is the preservation of liberty," but seems to mean, strictly 
speaking, that "constitutionalism requires the preservation of liberty." This lack of preci-
sion is unfortunate as the differences between these concepts may be significant. Thus, 
for example, whereas it is beyond question that since 1787 the United States has had a 
"constitutional government," in as much as slavery was condoned by the 1787 constitu-
tion, arguably the United States did not conform to the fundamental dictates of constitu-
tionalism prior to its adoption of the Civil War Amendments. See Rosenfeld, 14 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 497 (cited in note 3), and David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism 
in America, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 577 (1993). 
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canism, and pluralism; the tension between a constitution's mis-
sion to bind future generations and the broad interpretive 
latitude characteristic of the actual practice of judicial review; 
and, the important pedagogic function of the constitution and of 
judicial elaborations of the meaning of the constitution. Further-
more, taking good advantage of the particularly strong influence 
of American free speech jurisprudence on the elaboration of Is-
raeli doctrine on this subject, Jacobsohn provides an in-depth ex-
amination of a concrete example of constitutional transplantation 
and explores the relationship between a transplanted constitu-
tional norm and the evolution of constitutional doctrine to adapt 
the transplanted norm for use in its adoptive land. 
It is of course impossible, within the scope of the present 
review, to do justice to Jacobsohn's discussion of all the above-
mentioned issues. Consequently, I shall focus in the remainder 
of this review on the following subjects: the relationship among 
constitutionalism, pluralism, and identity; constitutionalism, con-
stitution, and judicial review; and constitutional transplantation, 
constitutional norms, and constitutional doctrine. 
I 
Constitutionalism makes little sense in the absence of any 
pluralism. In a completely homogeneous community with a sin-
gle-minded collective purpose and without a conception of the 
individual as having any legitimate rights or interests separate 
from those of the community as a whole, constitutionalism-
broadly conceived as requiring limitations on the powers of gov-
ernment, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of fun-
damental rights-would be superfluous. Indeed, in such a 
community there would be no palpable need to separate the gov-
ernors from the governed, or lawmaking from interpreting or en-
forcing the law, and the relevant normative universe would be 
exclusively based on duties rather than on rights.6 By contrast, 
once pluralism enters the scene-in the broad sense of any divi-
sion of the collectivity along the axes of self and other, whether 
in terms of ethnic, cultural, or religious differences or in terms of 
an individualism driven by the recognition of a multiplicity of 
values and objectives-constitutionalism not only makes sense 
but also looms as perhaps the best means to safeguard the integ-
rity of the various parts in harmony with the pursuit of the objec-
6. For an illuminating discussion of the contrast between a jurisprudence of right 
and a jurisprudence of duty, see Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 877 (1989). 
436 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:432 
tives of the polity as a whole. With the advent of pluralism, 
however, identity tends to become problematic to the extent that 
the constitutional identity of the polity must remain distinct from 
the identity of the diverse groups that comprise the nation or 
from the pre-constitutional identity of the nation or of its 
people.? 
Jacobsohn draws on the most salient contrasts between 
American and Israeli pluralism in order to provide a vivid illus-
tration of how different conceptions of the relation between the 
individual and the group and between cultural and political iden-
tity bear on the shaping of constitutional identity. Both Israel 
and the United States are pluralist societies marked by differ-
ences that pit individual against group and that render the nation 
distinct from the state. Moreover, the particular brand of plural-
ism prevalent respectively in each of the two countries plays a 
critical role in determining the form, scope, and limits of consti-
tutionalism in that country. 
American pluralism, as Jacobsohn emphasizes, is primarily 
individualistic in nature.s Israel's pluralism, on the other hand, 
is, in Jacobsohn's portrayal, primarily, though by no means exclu-
sively, communitarian. Indeed, although the communitarian 
bonds embedded in the historical, cultural, and religious tradi-
tions of the Jewish people play a predominant role in defining 
the identity of the Israeli polity, commitment to civil rights also 
plays an important role in the constitutional aspirations of the 
state of Israel.9 Moreover, notwithstanding differences in Ameri-
can and Israeli pluralism, both polities have experienced conflicts 
that have variously pitted the individual against other individu-
als, the individual against the group, and one group against an-
other. The difference between the American and the Israeli 
brand of pluralism becomes manifest, however, in the ways in 
which their respective political and constitutional cultures ap-
proach such conflicts. 
7. Constitutional identity in a pluralist society must bridge not only the gap be-
tween groups with divergent ethnic, cultural, and religious identities but also the gap be-
tween the generation of the constitution makers and subsequent generations expected to 
regard the constitution devised by their ancestors as legitimate. 
8. "Entrance into the mainstream of American political, economic, and cultural life 
presupposes a formal acknowledgment of the primacy of the individual to the group." 
9. As Jacobsohn points out, the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which pro-
vides the framework for Israeli constitutionalism, charts a constitutional course poised to 
fuel a fundamental tension between the communitarian objectives of the Jewish people 
and the individualistic goals promoted through vindication of the civil and political rights 
of the citizen. 
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To take one of the most telling examples, that of the place of 
religion in the polity, the United States has dealt with the 
problems confronting a religiously pluralistic society in ways that 
are markedly different from those adopted in Israel. Thus, in the 
United States religious conflicts are handled through the relega-
tion of religion to the private sphere.to Also, consistent with 
these constitutional constraints that lend support to America's 
pluralistic individualism, religious groups, as Jacobsohn notes, 
are required to function like voluntary associations rather than as 
largely autonomous self-governing communities. In Israel, on 
the other hand, religious groups do function much more as self-
governing communities, and the Jewish religion occupies a pre-
dominant position. Moreover, although, as Jacobsohn notes, 
Israel is not a theocracy, religious groups not only play an impor-
tant role in the public sphere but also retain considerable author-
ity over their members, including those who are recalcitrant. 
Thus, there is no civil marriage in Israel, which means that indi-
viduals must turn to religious authorities to get married and that 
no provision exists for intermarriage between members of differ-
ent faiths.ll 
America's individualistic pluralism steeped in an assimila-
tionist culture blends with a constitutional identity dominated by 
the metaphor of the social contract. Modern social contract the-
ory furnishes a model of political and constitutional identity that 
relies heavily on a rejection of history, custom, and tradition in 
favor of an ahistorical and atomistic individualism.u Consistent 
with a constitutional identity squarely grounded on adherence to 
social contractarian ideology, moreover, group claims and the 
collective interests of historically grounded communities would 
have to give way to the separate interests and pursuits of autono-
mous individuals. Also, under this view of constitutional iden-
tity, individuals are conceived as being externally bound to each 
other through the limited links of a consensual joint association 
committed to neutrality towards the competing beliefs, aims, and 
objectives of its members. 
A social contractarian constitutional identity that exalts the 
individual over the group goes hand in hand with a strong com-
10. Seep. 28, where Jacobsohn cites Justice O'Connor's statement that "The Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to religion relevant in any 
way to a person's standing in the political community." (citation omitted). 
11. See lzhak Englard, Religious Law in the Israel Legal System 142 (Alpha Press, 
1975). 
12. See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Con-
tract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 769, 820-23, 847-56 (1985). 
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mitment to individual rights to the exclusion of group rights. Ac-
cordingly, particular ethnic, religious and cultural identities must 
be held in check and excluded from the public place to give way 
to the construction of a polity in the image of an assimilationist 
"melting pot." Significantly, as Jacobsohn stresses, in the United 
States the state precedes the nation and the Constitution pro-
vides the essential framework that enables culturally, ethnically, 
and religiously diverse individuals to combine into a coherent 
whole. Moreover, America's general hostility to group rights is 
so pervasive that even good-faith efforts to vindicate exceptional 
yet clearly recognized group rights, such as those of Native 
Americans, end up in failure. Indeed, as Jacobsohn emphasizes, 
Congress' attempts to protect the collective rights of Native 
Americans have been largely unsuccessful, as they run counter to 
"the prevailing model of constitutional and political pluralism." 
In Israel, on the other hand, group identity plays a central 
role in defining the configuration of the polity. This is made 
plain by the stark contrast between the predominance of the Jew-
ish people in the institutional order of the State of Israel and the 
marginal role reserved to Native Americans in the structuring of 
the American polity. But if Israel's pluralism is more group-ori-
ented than its American counterpart, Israel's constitutional iden-
tity is by no means simply collectivist. Indeed, consistent with 
Jacobsohn's analysis, the Israeli experience reveals an unresolved 
tension between two different strains of collective pluralism, 
namely religious pluralism and ethnocentric pluralism, and also 
between collective values and individual choice.13 Moreover, be-
cause it has failed to reach a consensus around any particular 
constitutional identity, Israel does not have a completed constitu-
tion but rather a constitution in the making. In other words, the 
unresolved clash between Israel's collectivist and individualist 
tendencies has both made it impossible thus far for it to settle on 
any particular constitutional identity and has shaped the constitu-
tional problems and the constitutional solutions that have laid 
down the path for Israel's constitution in the making. 
The contrast between the United States' sharply defined in-
dividualist constitutional identity and Israel's problematic consti-
tutional identity caught between strong communal and 
individualistic tendencies casts light both on Israeli and Ameri-
can constitutionalism. On the one hand, the contrast in question 
13. Jacobsohn refers to Shlomo Avineri's argument that the links between religion 
and nationalism in Israel are derived from the intersection of ethnicity and religion in 
Eastern Europe. 
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makes palpable the limits of Israeli receptivity to the importation 
of American constitutional norms. On the other hand, this con-
trast draws attention to the way in which America's strong con-
stitutional identity inhibits the formation of any workable 
synthesis between any genuine communitarian ethos and the pre-
vailing constitutional culture. In particular, Jacobsohn makes a 
persuasive case for the proposition that all of the recent attempts 
to revive or rethink republicanism to stir American constitution-
alism towards a more communitarian course are bound to fall 
short. Indeed, given America's firmly implanted individualist 
constitutional identity, republicanism cannot generate sufficient 
appeal unless it is shorn of its anti-individualist features or com-
plemented by strict adherence to fundamental liberal norms. In 
short, because of the constraints imposed by America's constitu-
tional identity, the most that the revival of classical republican-
ism could hope to achieve is to temper the prevailing 
individualism rather than fomenting any major shift towards 
communitarianism. 
II 
Focus on the nexus between constitutionalism, actual consti-
tutions, and judicial review underscores some of the most funda-
mental and vexing issues confronting those who aspire to abide 
by the norms inherent in constitutionalism. Chief among these 
issues are: whether constitutionalism calls for a completed consti-
tution or whether it is compatible with a constitution in the mak-
ing; whether constitutionalism is essentially democratic or 
antidemocratic in naturet4; and, whether authoritative judicial re-
view of constitutional norms ultimately safeguards or threatens 
constitutional democracy-the so called countermajoritarian 
problem.ts By relying on the contrast between the United 
States' written constitution and Israel's unwritten one, and be-
tween the apparent judicial supremacy in constitutional interpre-
tation in the United States as against the kind of parliamentary 
supremacy prevalent in Israel, Jacobsohn presents many useful 
insights into these crucial issues. In particular, Jacobsohn sue-
14. Compare Jon Elster, Introduction, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Consti-
tutionalism and Democracy 1, 2 (Cambridge U. Press, 1988) ("[c]onstitutionalism refers to 
limits on majority decisions"), with Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the paradox of 
democracy in id. at 195, 197 ("constitutionalism and democracy are mutually 
supportive"). 
15. For a systematic analysis of judicial review and the countermajoritarian problem, 
see Carlos Santiago Nino, A Philosophical Reconstruction of Judicial Review, 14 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 799 (1993). 
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ceeds in demonstrating how comparative analysis can broaden 
and deepen our understanding of these issues even if some of his 
specific observations and conclusions are-as we shall see-
somewhat contestable. 
Jacobsohn convincingly indicates, through his appraisal of 
the Israeli experience, that neither a written nor a completed 
constitution is necessary to the implantation of constitutionalism. 
Because the Israeli polity is caught between the conflicting prin-
ciples of its Declaration of Independence, it cannot readily settle 
on a full-blown constitution and has, accordingly, opted, in 
Jacobsohn's term, "to grow" a constitution. Moreover, in as 
much as Israel lacks a strong democratic tradition, the Israeli 
Supreme Court has often selected constitutional solutions 
designed to promote democracy. Consistent with this, in at least 
some settings, constitutionalism appears to go hand in hand with 
democracy.16 
Because of Israel's parliamentary supremacy and lack of a 
written constitution, one might think that its judges would be re-
luctant to generate a significant constitutional jurisprudence 
through judicial review. Paradoxically, however, the lack of tex-
tual constraints coupled with the knowledge that the Knesset has 
the power to overturn any judicially created constitutional norm 
to which it objects has had a powerful liberating effect on the 
justices on the Israeli Supreme Court. Accordingly, Israeli 
judges have had great latitude in inventing their constitution, 
leading Jacobsohn to regard them as co-authors of the 
constitution. 
In contrast, since its early years, the United States has had a 
written constitution which its Founders envisioned as "the final 
legitimation of their Revolution, a revolution that gave birth to a 
new people." Nevertheless, the American Constitution was to 
remain at odds both with the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence17 and with the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism so 
long as it condoned slavery.1s Moreover, while the Civil War 
Amendments rectified this glaring deficiency, in the long run 
these amendments-and more particularly the Fourteenth 
Amendment-have led the United States toward a brand of con-
stitutionalism marked by a significant anti-democratic · ten-
16. For a persuasive argument that constitutionalism must be linked to democracy 
to become successful in formerly socialist Eastern and Central Europe, see Andrew 
Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe, 14 
Cardozo L. Rev. 661, 685-87 (1993). 
17. See Richards, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 5n (cited in note 5). 
18. See supra note 5. 
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dency.19 Indeed, through reliance on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights 
as well as certain unenumerated rights have become enforceable 
against the various states.zo Accordingly, time and again demo-
cratically enacted state legislation has been set aside in order to 
vindicate constitutional rights, pitting American constitutional-
ism against majoritarian policy and exacerbating the 
countermajoritarian problem posed by judicial elaboration of 
constitutional norms. 
According to Jacobsohn, the moral consensus that informs 
America's written constitution legitimizes the Supreme Court's 
countermajoritarian role as authoritative interpreter of the con-
stitution. Referring to the Supreme Court's shameful decision in 
Dred Scott, Jacobsohn insists, however, that the Supreme Court 
is not beyond error or willful distortion. Accordingly, Jacobsohn 
suggests that it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to enjoy 
"an unqualified finality in constitutional interpretation." 
Jacobsohn asserts that this latter proposition is not widely 
shared, but that claim is questionable, particularly in more recent 
years, ever since Attorney General Edwin Meese made his fa-
mous statement distinguishing "the constitution" from "constitu-
tional law" and arguing that the Executive Branch is bound by 
the constitution but not by the constitutional interpretations is-
sued by the Supreme Court.zt Actually, while there is broad con-
sensus that a Supreme Court constitutional decision is absolutely 
binding as to the rights and obligations of the parties before it, 
there is wide disagreement concerning the scope and limitation 
of the finality of Supreme Court constitutional pronouncements 
beyond thatzz 
19. I am assuming for purposes of this discussion that democracy can generally be 
equated with majority rule. I am fully aware, of course, that most sophisticated concep-
tions of democracy entail complex relationships between majoritarian and an-
timajoritarian features. For example, in the context of a model of democracy as 
deliberative, antimajoritarian rights to present unpopular political views may well play a 
crucial role in the legitimation of majority rule. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (Kennikat Press, 1948). Nonetheless, 
since many of the antimajoritarian rights recognized as protected by the American Con-
stitution are arguably not essential to the functioning of democratic self-government, such 
as most of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights, equating democracy with 
majoritarian rule will do both in terms of dealing with the contrast between Israel and the 
United States and with the countermajoritarian problem raised by judicial review of con-
stitutional norms. 
20. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
21. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Thl. L. Rev. CJ79 (1987). 
22. For a recent sampling of different positions on this issue, see, e.g., Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 43 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of 
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One may also object to the characterization (which Jacob-
sohn seems to endorse) of the Supreme Court's decision in Dred 
Scott as being in error. Indeed, whereas Dred Scott flies in the 
face of the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism, it is not in-
consistent with a constitutional text that grants implicit recogni-
tion to the institution of slavery.23 More generally, to the extent 
that, even in the United States, constitutionalism and constitu-
tion are not necessarily coextensive, and that controversies con-
cerning constitutional interpretation in cases such as Dred Scott, 
Lochner, Griswold, or Roe v. Wade may be less a matter of error 
or of willful distortion than of the plausibility of contradictory 
interpretations of the written constitution, the counter-
majoritarian problem in the United States and the determination 
of the ultimate authoritativeness of judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution may well pose more vexing and intractable 
problems than Jacobsohn's account would suggest. 
Because they deal with a written constitution, American 
judges seem to be on firmer ground than their Israeli counter-
parts when it comes to the issuance of constitutional opinions. 
But because there is no parliamentary sovereignty in the United 
States and because the American Constitution is completely si-
lent on the question who bears the ultimate responsibility for 
constitutional interpretation,24 the role of American judges may 
in the end be more problematic than that of Israeli judges. 
Jacobsohn, however, underestimates the difficulties posed by the 
American type of constitutionalism, which relies heavily on judi-
cial intervention to vindicate fundamental, anti-majoritarian con-
stitutional rights. Indeed, while Jacobsohn is certainly aware of 
these difficulties, he overestimates the importance of having a 
written constitutional text. To be sure, Jacobsohn is right in as 
much as the existence of a written constitutional text seems 
bound to impose on judges many significant constraints which 
otherwise would not be present. Whether a written constitution 
imposes more constraints on judges than an unwritten one, how-
ever, depends ultimately on many different factors, including the 
nature of the relevant constitutional text and the particular ele-
ments that inform the constitutional identity and political culture 
Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (1993); David A. 
Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113 (1993); 
Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflec-
tions on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers.-~15 Cardozo L. Rev. 
137 (1993). 
23. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
24. See Rosenfeld, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. at 137 nn. 1-2 (cited in note 22). 
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of the relevant country without a constitution. Thus, for exam-
ple, the texts of such open-ended clauses as the Due Process 
Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the American Constitution arguably constrain judges far 
less than would a constitutional identity and political culture re-
flecting an unwavering consensus on the sanctity of human life 
since conception and on the intolerable evil of racial apartheid.25 
In short, whereas the United States' constitutional identity is set-
tled in a way that the Israeli is not, and whereas the United 
States' written constitution undoubtedly imposes numerous pal-
pable constraints on the judges charged with its interpretation, 
the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence over the last 
century-particularly in the fields of federalism and fundamental 
individual rights-amply justifies the conclusion that American 
judges are indeed the co-authors of an evolving constitution 
rather than the mere expositors of largely uncontroverted consti-
tutional norms. 
Especially when contrasted with the predominant concern of 
Israeli judges to emphasize the democratic aspects of constitu-
tionalism, American judicial activism in constitutional law relates 
largely to the antidemocratic aspects of constitutionalism, thus 
exacerbating the countermajoritarian problem. In Jacobsohn's 
view, "over the last twenty-five years or so a dominant school has 
existed in the United States, one advancing a model of the 
Supreme Court as a critical agent for principled social change of 
the sort that is measurable in terms of an expanding domain of 
individual rights." That model, however, may well be out of 
date. Not only have individual rights generally ceased to expand 
in the last two decades, but also in many cases they have been 
considerably cut back.26 
Consistent with these observations, whereas it is hard to dis-
pute that American constitutionalism possesses a distinct an-
tidemocratic component, the controversy over the proper role of 
judicial review in constitutional cases seems to boil down to a 
dispute over the legitimate boundaries between the will of polit-
25. Indeed, in the latter case, it would be inconceivable that judges would disagree 
over the existence of a constitutional right to abortion, as the United States Supreme 
Court Justices did in Roe v. Wade, or that they could interpret constitutional equality as 
being compatible with racial apartheid, as did the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson. 
26. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusal to extend privacy 
rights to consensual homosexual relationships among adults); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (significant curtailment of constitutional 
rights to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (previ-
ously recognized interest in reputation no longer held included in constitutional protec-
tion of "liberty"). 
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ical majorities and the antimajoritarian constraints arising from 
the vindication of constitutionally sanctioned individual rights. 
In the context of that dispute, moreover, the textualists and the 
judicial conservatives display a strong proclivity against expan-
sion of the Constitution's antidemocratic injunctions while liberal 
judicial activists tend to embrace a contrary approach with the 
aim of better securing individual rights against unwarranted 
majoritarian incursions. Contrary to Jacobsohn's suggestion, 
however, the textualist approach is not necessarily the preferred 
one in the context of a written constitution such as the American. 
Indeed, in spite of much of the prevailing rhetoric,27 in the con-
text of the many broad, general, and open-ended provisions of 
the American Constitution, textualists and judicial conservatives 
take on the role of co-authors of the Constitution as much as 
their most liberal counterparts.28 In the last analysis, therefore, 
the nature and severity of the constraints which a written consti-
tution is likely to impose on judicial constitution-making depends 
on the confluence of several factors, including the nature of the 
relevant socio-political context as well as the character and speci-
ficity of the constitutional text involved. 
27. A seemingly attractive line of argument is that democracy and majority rule are 
paramount except to the extent that the text of the Constitution clearly calls for protec-
tion of antimajoritarian rights. Moreover, when the text of the Constitution is unclear, 
judges should err on the side of democracy rather than on that of expanding encroach-
ments on majority rule. So long as these prescriptions are strictly adhered to, judges-so 
the argument goes-should be deemed to "interpret" the Constitution rather than "mak-
ing" or "co-authoring" it. 
Upon reflection, there are many difficulties with this argument. Suffice it to point 
out that, at least in the context of general, open-ended constitutional provisions such as 
the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Framers may have constitutionalized antimajoritarian protections with deliberately 
indeterminate boundaries so as to enable each generation to adjust them to meet its own 
specific needs. From that perspective, a restrictive reading of the constitutional text 
would be a further elaboration of constitutional prescriptions in precisely the same way as 
an expansive reading of that text. Furthermore, even if one focuses exclusively on the 
issue of democracy, so long as the Constitution is viewed as the product of a qualified 
majority engaged in "constitutional politics" rather than in "normal politics," see Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Neo-federalism?, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 153, 162-63 (cited in 
note 14), then a restrictive reading of a constitutional provision runs the same risk as does 
an expansive reading to contravene the will of the relevant majority. 
28. For example, the (unenumerated) right to privacy is, strictly speaking, neither 
explicitly included in, nor explicitly excluded from, the set of rights that may be plausibly 
deemed to come within the sweep of the American Constitution. Accordingly, a judicial 
recognition of a constitutional privacy right is as much a further elaboration of the Consti-
tution as an explicit judicial declaration that the Constitution does not protect the right to 
privacy. Compare the majority concurring and dissenting opinions in Griswold. 
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III 
The question of constitutional transplantation is complex 
enough to preclude a straightforward answer. Among other 
things, one must distinguish between the possibility and the de-
sirability of constitutional transplantation. Moreover, even if a 
particular constitutional norm appears to have been successfully 
transplanted to a second home, it may occupy such a different 
position in the constellation of constitutional norms prevalent in 
its adoptive country than it does in the constitutional framework 
of its country of origin as to make it difficult to assess whether 
the transplantation was ultimately desirable or successful. Fur-
thermore, even assuming that two countries had adopted identi-
cal sets of constitutional norms, their respective constitutional 
practices (e.g., the relative importance of judicial review) and 
constitutional doctrines may be sufficiently divergent as to 
render problematic any comprehensive assessment of the success 
of transplantation. 
While keeping these difficulties in mind, useful insights into 
the question of transplantation can nonetheless be gained from a 
consideration of actual instances, such as those involving Israeli 
borrowings from the United States, particularly if one keeps in 
mind that these transplantations are embedded in the dynamics 
of evolving constitutional orders. As Jacobsohn emphasizes, the 
desirability of constitutional transplantation is to an important 
degree a function of political culture. Also, as Jacobsohn notes, 
one can gain a better sense of the phenomenon of constitutional 
transplantation if one considers both its positive and its negative 
dimensions.29 Furthermore, the desirability and likelihood of 
success of a given transplantation depends on the respective con-
stitutional identities of the two countries involved. 
Focusing on the phenomenon of constitutional transplanta-
tion through concentration on the constitutional protection of 
freedom of speech seems particularly appropriate for at least a 
couple of reasons. First, broadly articulated freedom of speech 
provisions are included in constitutions throughout the world,3o 
but, notwithstanding similarities in formulation, yield widely di-
vergent scopes of protection to speech.3t And, second, as al-
29. The negative dimension of constitutional transplantation refers to "the process 
in which Country A's example is carefully considered and then rejected by Country B." 
30. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitu-
tional Categories, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 865, 868 (1993). 
31. Id. at 868-71. According to Schauer, "so long as cultural differences are re-
flected in categorical differences, differences in the scope of constitutional protections can 
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ready mentioned,32 American free speech jurisprudence has been 
particularly influential in Israel, a fact that is all the more inter-
esting given the marked differences in political culture and con-
stitutional identity between the two countries. 
Both Israel and the United States are strongly committed to 
upholding freedom of speech as an important constitutional 
norm. Moreover, as Jacobsohn accurately notes, although there 
is a lack of consensus among American First Amendment theo-
rists concerning the ultimate justification for, or objectives of, 
free speech, commitment to a content-neutral approach to 
speech remains a predominant and seemingly unshakeable fea-
ture of American free speech jurisprudence.33 In Israel, how-
ever, content-neutrality is virtually unthinkable in the context of 
the expression of religious or racial hatred.34 Given this impor-
tant difference, it is surprising that Israel has thus far relied so 
much on American First Amendment jurisprudence, and all the 
more so since America's tolerance for racist speech is squarely at 
odds with the constitutional jurisprudence of most Western 
democracies. 
Whether or not to tolerate extremist speech poses vexing 
difficulties for liberal democracies.3s Nevertheless, it is plain 
from a consideration of their contrasting pluralisms, political cul-
tures and realities, and constitutional identities, why Israel and 
the United States have reached opposite conclusions concerning 
racist speech. In the United States, individualistic pluralism 
tends to abstract the individual from the group to the point of 
downplaying the importance on individuals of injuries stemming 
from their group affiliations. In Israel, on the other hand, com-
mitment to a more communitarian pluralism not only places far 
greater weight on group defamation but also casts injuries stem-
ming from group affiliation as much more threatening to individ-
ual integrity and self-fulfillment. Furthermore, whereas the 
United States has experienced "pluralistic intolerance" -i.e., a 
situation in which there is so much disagreement over the targets 
of intolerance as to minimize the threat to any particular group 
be expected to vary far more than might be expected merely by inspecting the relevant 
constitutional language." ld. at 879. 
32. See supra, p. 434. 
33. For an example of a recent reaffirmation of content-neutrality in the context of 
hate speech and "fighting words," see R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992}. 
34. Cf. Editorial, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 2, 1986 {"What could be more natural for a 
state that arose from the ashes of a racist holocaust than to declare incitement to racism a 
criminal offense?"), p. 181. 
35. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Michel Rosenfeld, Extremist Speech and 
The Paradox of Tolerance, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1457 (1987) {book review). 
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that encounters intolerance-Israel is prey to "focused intoler-
ance" primarily against its Arab minority, which is a source of 
subjective and objective threat. Thus, whereas the United States 
may afford tolerating intolerance,36 Israel could well threaten the 
continued viability of its polity by doing likewise. 
Consistent with these observations, it would seem that Israel 
would have a very strong incentive to embrace a constitutional 
doctrine that is markedly different from its American counter-
part, at least when it comes to dealing with racist speech. For 
example, Israel could have excluded racist speech from the scope 
of speech entitled to constitutional protection, thus carving out a 
content-based exception to the general rule that all political 
speech comes within the sweep of the constitutional right to free 
speech. Instead, as Jacobsohn notes, Israel has embraced Ameri-
can First Amendment doctrine by including racist speech within 
the scope of speech eligible for protection, and then proceeded 
to ban such speech by positing its potential for collective harm 
(and for harm to individuals on account of their group affilia-
tions) as sufficiently serious to warrant suppression-this latter 
conclusion being in sharp contrast with the prevalent American 
conclusion that the injuries of racist speech do not justify 
suppression. 
Israel's puzzling insistence to embrace American First 
Amendment doctrine to reach a diametrically opposed conclu-
sion on racist speech provides, consistent with Jacobsohn's analy-
sis, a vivid illustration of the vicissitudes of constitutional 
transplantation. As Jacobsohn sees it, Israel's borrowings from 
American First Amendment jurisprudence do not result from the 
presence of overlapping needs or objectives. Instead, "[t)he sig-
nificance of the frequent references to American sources is that 
they have contributed to the failure of the Israeli Supreme Court 
to develop a free speech jurisprudence that reflects the character 
of the larger pluralist democracy of which it is a part." This fail-
ure, however, is not really one, according to Jacobsohn, to the 
extent that it has the salutary effect of promoting democratic val-
ues in the absence of a lack of consensus concerning a satisfac-
tory reconciliation of constitutional doctrine and political culture. 
Accordingly, in this instance at least, constitutional transplanta-
tion amounts to both less and more than originally meets the eye. 
It amounts to less in that the similarities in doctrine mask more 
36. This view, however, is by no means universally shared. See, e.g., Mari J. Mat-
suda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 
2320 (1989). 
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important differences concerning the respective modalities of 
analysis, constitutional objectives, and results, thus underscoring 
the need for a firmly grounded contextual approach to constitu-
tional transplantation. But such transplantation can also achieve 
more than meets the eye in that the transplanted norms may 
have beneficial side effects, such as the long-term promotion of 
democratic values in a sociopolitical environment otherwise tom 
between democratic and anti-democratic tendencies. In short, 
constitutional transplantation may sometimes be desirable, but 
not necessarily for the reasons that one might expect. 
In the last analysis, Jacobsohn's Apple of Gold makes a ma-
jor contribution to the elucidation of some of the most important 
issues that confront the contemporary movement towards consti-
tutionalism. To be sure, some of Jacobsohn's insights and conclu-
sions are contestable, and his focus on Israel and the United 
States may be at times too narrow to support any definitive reso-
lution of some of the problems which he addresses. Neverthe-
less, Jacobson's sharp and comprehensive analysis succeeds 
admirably in conveying an accurate sense of the complexity of 
the issues involved as well as in suggesting attractive hypotheses 
which may well be borne out by further comparative work en-
compassing other constitutions and other political cultures. 
Above all, what emerges from Jacobsohn's excellent analysis 
is that comparative constitutionalism is a worthwhile and very 
useful, even if often difficult, endeavor which ought to be more 
widely embraced. Indeed, the relationships between constitu-
tionalism, constitutional identity, political culture, and constitu-
tional transplantation loom as neither transparent enough to 
allow for sweeping generalizations nor as opaque and uniquely 
idiosyncratic enough to justify giving up on comparative work. 
Based on Jacobsohn's comparison of the American and the Is-
raeli experiences, these relationships are simultaneously shaped 
by the constraints of being embedded in a particular sociopoliti-
cal and historical context and by the aspiration to converge to-
wards a cluster of commonly held or overlapping values. The 
more we learn about the interplay between particular constraints 
and general aspirations, the better we are bound to understand 
the scope and limits of the contemporary drive towards 
constitutionalism. 
